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Abstract 
Smart Grid (SG) promises efficient, sustainable, green and reliable electrical delivery by combining the 
existing electrical distribution network assets with modern information and communications technologies 
(ICT) in order to transfer information and energy in both directions. Introduction of these intelligent 
devices will help the grid monitor, protect, and automatically optimise the operation of interconnected 
elements, in addition to interaction between energy suppliers and consumers. However, this exposes the 
future grid to new security challenges and risks. In this paper, a framework for protecting Smart Grid 
applications using geographic location of the devices connected to it is proposed. With this framework, 
each device on the grid adds an extra layer of security. The proposed scheme is not application or device 
specific which means it can be implemented on any communication node on the grid. The scheme uses an 
algebraic code based cryptosystems known as GPT (Gabidulin -Paramonov-Trejtakov), which provides a 
very strong protection while utilising the smallest key size as compared to other cryptosystems based on 
algebraic codes.  As with other code based cryptosystems, the proposed security framework protects grid 
information against cyber threats as well as against channel impairments in the form of error protection 
codes. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Recently, there has been a lot of  research interests in new ways of producing, distributing and managing 
electric energy in order to facilitate cleaner, environmentally friendly and sustainable consumption[1][2]. 
Future electric networks are also expected to be resilient, ensure delivery of efficient service, and have 
technologies that enable it to self-heal. Consumers would also be able to take part in production and 
decision making. A major component of such grid of the future is communication. By installing 
communication systems at different points within the electric network, the current 'dumb' electrical grid 
will be transformed into an improved and intelligent grid also known as  Smart Grid. The complexity and 
scale of a SG poses some serious challenges. Some of these are related to security of the grid and privacy 
of the consumers. Although SG enhances better power distribution, and integration of renewable energies, 
it does so at a cost.  The increase in the number of devices in the grid makes it more vulnerable to 
physical as well as cyber-attacks such as Trojans, denial of service attacks, viruses, malwares etc. ICT 
systems supporting critical infrastructure (e.g. energy plants, water plants, financial entities, public 
administrations, transport networks, etc.)  are no longer separated and isolated entities. The 
interconnection with other public and open networks causes security problems, and successful attacks 
may have significant effects, such as, for example, energy blackouts. Moreover, the crucial information 
from monitoring systems may be delayed or even lost, preventing early warning systems from proper and 
on- time reaction.   
Since SG communication technologies are in their development stage, hence new security features could 
still be included in the design and development of Smart Grids devices because introduction of such 
important components after deployment could be more expensive, in terms of cost, time, and customer 
satisfaction.  
In this paper, a security framework for protecting SG infrastructure using location based encryption, also 
known as Geo-Encryption is proposed. This location based security is designed using one of the algebraic 
code-based cryptosystems called GPT named after its inventors; Gabidulin, Paramanov and Tretjakov [3]. 
The GPT cryptosystem is the third cryptosystem of its kind. The first code-based cryptosystem, based on 
Goppa codes was proposed in 1978 by McEliece [14]. In 1986, another code-based cryptosystem was 
proposed by Niederreiter [15]. These cryptosystems are based on the problem of decoding a general linear 
code, which is considered very difficult to solve in polynomial time. The cryptosystem proposed by 
McEliece is still unbroken with its original parameter but it has not gained wider acceptance because of 
its very large key size. Algebraic code-based cryptosystem has been chosen for Smart Grids instead of the 
existing systems, which are based on number theoretic approaches because research results published in 
[11] and [12] have shown that the existing systems may not survive future cyber threats. This is due to 
evolutionary developments in computing hardware and the introduction of quantum computing. The 
prime candidates for future security are code-based cryptosystems. Furthermore, public key 
cryptosystems based on algebraic coding theory are several times faster than the Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, 
and Leonard Adleman (RSA) cryptosystems. The key attraction of GPT when compared with other code 
based cryptosystems is that it uses the smallest key size, which means lower complexity. This is because 
the GPT is based on rank error correcting codes and uses the Rank metric instead of Hamming metric. 
Rank codes are well-structured codes. Therefore, several structural attacks have been proposed against the 
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GPT cryptosystem [5] ,[6]. Some modifications to withstand these attacks are also proposed in [7], [8] 
and [9]. To the best of authors’ knowledge these modifications withstand all the known attacks against the 
different variants of the cryptosystem.  GPT cryptosystems do not only secure data against cyber threats; 
but  also protect data against channel impairments in the form of error protection codes. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly explains geo encryption and GPT 
cryptosystem. The proposed scheme is presented in section 3.  Results and analysis are given in section 4 
while section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. GEO ENCRYPTION 
In Geo encryption, a message is encrypted such that it can only be decrypted at a specified location and at 
a specified time. If any user tries to decrypt the cipher text at any location or time, other than the 
specified, the decryption fails. It can only be achieved using a location dependent decryption key. The 
idea of location based authentication was first proposed in [10]. The authors presented a mechanism for 
restricting the internet access for remote users based on their geographical location. In order to get access 
to the server, a geographical location based signature was created and appended to the data packet along 
with location data collected from satellites and then transferred to the server. At the receiver, the server 
verifies this signature by its own simultaneously collected satellite location information about the remote 
user and allows access to the user if he/she is within acceptable range. 
A. GPT cryptosystem 
Let F2 be a finite field of q elements and let F2N be an extension field of degree N. Let a = (a1, a2... an) 
be a vector with coordinates in F2N. 
    The Rank norm of a is defined as the maximal number of ai, which are linearly independent over the 
base field F2 and is denoted Rk(a | F2). In our scheme, we will consider the specifications of GPT 
cryptosystem proposed in [8]. The Public key is given in equation (1) below 
 
Gpub = S(X|G)P                         (1) 
 
Where S is a k x k non-singular row scrambler matrix based over the extension field. X is a k x t1 matrix 
called distortion matrix. The matrix is not required for decryption, so it can be deleted after encryption. 
The matrix P is a non-singular column scrambler matrix of order (n+t1), partially based over the extension 
field. The k x n generator matrix G is of the form given below 
 
 
 (2) 
Where g1,g2....,gn are any set of elements over the 
extension field F2N which are linearly independent over 
base field Fq and g[i] = gq 
i mod n 
 means the ith Frobenius the 
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power of g. The code generated with (2) is called (n, k, d) code, where n is the code length, k is the 
information symbols and d which is equal to (n – k + 1) is the distance of the code.
 
For such code there exists 
a fast decoding algorithm which can correct rank errors up to .  Private Keys are S, G, P matrices 
and fast decoding algorithm.  Plain-text is the information vector of dimension k of the  form m = (m1, m2, 
m3, … , mk) based over F2N 
3. Proposed Scheme 
In order to generate a location-based key, two very important factors must be considered: area of 
decryption and accuracy of the location device, i.e., how large should the area for decryption be? It is 
very important that the area is not  too large as to  allow access to anyone  equally, it should not be too 
small as to shut out some of the intended users. Secondly, before encrypting any data with intended 
receiver’s geographical location parameters, the sender must consider the accuracy of the location device 
available at the receiver. Otherwise, even a legal receiver will be unable to calculate a valid decryption 
key. So there is a choice between either selecting the area of decryption large enough to cancel the 
accuracy errors of location device or the device must be accurate enough to give precise readings. 
Fig. 1 shows the framework of our proposed scheme. GPT is a public cryptosystem. Hence, the 
communicating parties do not need to exchange session keys, but in the proposed framework, we are 
using two instances of GPT cryptosystems. One instance is used to encrypt the actual plain-text using key 
matrices calculated by linearly combining intended receiver location information and randomly chosen 
key from the F2N whereas the second instance is used to encrypt the randomly chosen matrices using the 
public key of the receiver. At the other end, the receiver will calculate the part of the private keys using 
its location devices and calculate the final private keys by decrypting the keys using its own private keys 
and then linearly combining the two information. It should be noted that, in order to decrypt the original 
cipher-text, the receiver must correctly decrypt the  encrypted key information from the sender. It must 
also calculate the correct keys by using mapping function. Using any one of the information alone will 
result in failed decryption. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Proposed Framework 
Steps for calculating at either  end are explained below. 
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A. Sender side 
1) Randomly choose private key matrices. 
2) Take the geographical parameters of intended receiver. These parameters could be latitude, 
longitude and desired decryption time. Thencalculate location vector of length n. 
3) Linearly combine the matrices calculated in step 1 and location vector calculated in step 2 to get 
the session keys for encrypting plain-text. 
4) Encrypt the plain-text using session key calculated in step 3. 
5) Send the cipher-text calculated in step 4 to the receiver. 
6) Encrypt the randomly chosen private keys matrices using public key of the intended receiver. 
7) Send the encrypted key information calculated in step 6 to the receiver. 
B. Receiver side 
The receiver will take the following steps to recover the plain-text from cipher-text.  
 
1) Decrypt the encrypted key information using its private key. 
2) Take the geographical parameters of intended receiver. These parameters could be latitude, 
longitude and desired decryption time, then calculate location vector of length n. 
3) Linearly combine the matrices decrypted in step 1 and location vector calculated in step 2 to get 
the session keys for encrypting plain text. 
4) Using the session key calculated in step 3, decrypts the cipher-text sent from the sender and 
recovers the plain text. 
4. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
A. Security Analysis 
In any code-based cryptosystem, the public and private keys are in the form of matrices based over the 
finite field. Figure 2 shows different types of attacks against the cryptosystems. It has been shown that 
there could be two types of attacks against any code based cryptosystem; Structural attacks and Decoding 
attacks. In structural attacks, the adversary tries to recover private keys from the public key through 
mathematical transformations on the public key matrix. It was argued earlier that with the modifications 
proposed in [7], [8] and [9] GPT cryptosystem currently can withstand all the known structural attacks. 
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Figure 2. Different type of Attacks against GPT 
 
In decoding an attack, a cryptanalyst tries to decode any (n, k, d) linear code without the knowledge of the 
structure of the codes. In [13], authors propose two algorithms for decoding an arbitrary (n ,k) linear rank 
codes over FqN. These algorithms could be considered as the fastest decoding attacks against the GPT 
cryptosystem. The first algorithm correct t rank errors with  operations over the 
FqN whereas the second algorithm requires  operations over the F2N. Figure 3 
and Figure 4, respectively show the comparison between the sizes of the public key with the complexity 
of the two algorithms. Results show that security of the cryptosystem is proportional to the size of the 
public key, i.e., if we increase the size of the public key, the operational complexity of the decoding 
attacks increases. With current computing power, the key size with complexity higher than 290 is 
considered practically not feasible. These results show that the GPT cryptosystem having key size of 
around 5Kbits survives the first algorithm attack but to make the GPT cryptosystem completely secure 
against both of the algorithms proposed in [13], the key size must not be less than 7.5Kbits. This key size 
is quite big but still a lot smaller than the key sizes of the other two cryptosystems proposed in [14] and 
[15] which are 500Kbits and 48Kbits respectively.      
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Figure 3. Public Key Size Vs Complexity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Public Key Size Vs Complexity 
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B. Information Rate 
 
In any (n, k, d) linear codes, the length n of the code should be kept small for efficient transmission and 
more throughput whereas the k which is the dimension of the code should be kept large for sending wide 
variety of messages and better information rate. At the same time, the distance d, which depends on both 
n and k, should be large to correct more errors. Also, the size of the public key depends on these 
parameters. There is always a trade-off between choosing these parameters for optimum solution. Figure 
5 shows the comparison between the various key sizes and their effect on the information rate for 
different error correcting capabilities. We can deduce from the results that increasing the throughput of 
the system will increase the size of the public key and to minimize the key size, we have to compromise 
on the information rate 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Public Key Size Vs Information Rate 
 
C. Why GPT for Smart Grid 
Although number theoretic based cryptosystems such as RSA provide better information rate and fixed 
key size, GPT belongs to the family of cryptosystems considered to be prime candidates for future 
cryptography because of their capability to survive even with under the speed and number crunching 
ability of quantum computing.  Encryption and decryption of GPT is also multiple orders faster than RSA 
and it can provide error protection against channel impairments. By using very low key size, GPT saves 
cost in terms of the storage space required for storing the keys and high bandwidth communication 
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required for key transfer. GPT is therefore a smart choice to address security and privacy issues in Smart 
Grid. 
5. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, a framework for protecting Smart Grid infrastructure using GPT cryptosystem was 
presented. As Smart Grid is a very large distributed network connecting various heterogeneous devices 
and networks, the scheme is not targeted at specific application or service within a network; instead, it 
provides a method of protecting different critical communication infrastructures of Smart Grid using their 
geographical location parameters such as latitude and longitude. Examples of applications that could 
benefit from the scheme include, but are not limited to, communication links between Smart Meters and 
the substations, software upgrades, and distribution automation. For practical implementation of this 
scheme, location sensors or any other location device is required.  
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